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Abstract 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the provider of many critical natural resources. With such 
resources, one would expect these countries to have thriving economies. Why is the 
opposite case true? To answer such a question, this paper examines a few critical causes 
that may justify the current economic situation these African countries are experiencing. 
Specifically, the paper observes the economic impact of civil war and terrorist conflict in 
sub-Saharan Africa from 1971 to 2016. To explore the changes in GDP per capita for all 
these years, this thesis sheds light on three independent variables: year of conflict, 
education level, and foreign direct investment for many of the 47 sub-Saharan African 
countries. Replicating Paul Collier’s Bottom Billion, this thesis will delve into more recent 
trends of the past two decades, and why the lack of economic advancement is pertinent to 
these countries. With the results obtained, this thesis proposes solutions to lowering the 
impact of civil conflict, and steadily advancing the economies across the African continent.  
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I. Introduction  
 
Much of world has been rapidly advancing economically and technologically. The 
world has become an overall more peaceful place, where knowledge has been created to 
deliver technologies that positively impact peoples’ lives. Also, global trade has enhanced 
the quality of life and allowed for more global relations. However, this is not the case for 
everyone. Although the standard of living and quality of life is improving for 6 billion of 
the 7 billion people on this planet, the bottom billion people on earth are living in poverty 
and experiencing a decline in quality of life. These bottom billion are in large part located 
in India and Africa. As far as Africa is concerned, frequent wars, genocides, and civil 
conflicts have wiped out much of the meaningful effort of economic development. 
However, some African countries such as South Africa, Rwanda and North African 
countries are able to maintain peace and sustain solid economic prosperity. Why is it that 
the sub-Saharan regions of Africa cannot advance?  
Africa as a whole has an enormous chance at developing rapidly and successfully. 
It is important to note that the populations of sub-Saharan African countries are very young. 
Half of the black Africa population is less than 25 years old. This young generation 
represents the future of Africa. They are educated, well informed and able to leverage new 
tools available to them such as the internet and social media. Moreover, the French and 
English educational systems across sub-Saharan Africa are prone to facilitate immigration 
to Europe and the United States because the education system is either in French or English 
and mostly based on foreign education systems as a result of colonization. Africa has been 
on the path to adopting the latest internet and medical services. Also, Africa is the provider 
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of most critical natural resources in the world. African countries are actively working on 
transforming locally natural resources to serve local markets.  
The question stands, what makes for this growth disparity between these sub-
Saharan African countries and the majority of other countries around the world?  
As Collier and Gunning explain, Africa’s slow growth is partly explicable in terms 
of particular factors which are globally important for the growth process, but which are 
low in Africa (Collier and Gunning 1998). One of these factors is peace; in other words, 
the most imminent threats to growth in this area of the world are interstate and intrastate 
conflicts. These conflicts mainly present themselves in the form of civil wars and terrorism. 
A multitude of countries in Africa have been experiencing civil wars such as Nigeria, Chad, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and many others. In fact, seventy-
three percent of people in the societies of the bottom billion have recently been through a 
civil war or are still in one (Collier 17).  
Such conflicts have limited and severely impacted generations of young men and 
women, teachers, and engineers, depriving society of the work force necessary to sustain 
economic development. In Nigeria, Boko Haram has killed scores of innocent people 
leaving thousands of children without any family. In Mali, Islamic extremists have killed 
many innocent civilians, destroyed cultural symbols such as Timbuktu, and threatened to 
overthrow the local government. The killing of teachers and burning of schools has resulted 
in generations of children unable to be educated and therefore ill-equipped to be 
contributing forces to economic development. In fact, between 2009 and 2015, Boko 
Haram’s attacks destroyed more than 910 schools and forced at least 1,500 more to close.1 
                                                
1 “Nigeria: Northeast Children Robbed of Education.” Human Rights Watch, 11 Apr. 2016.  
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Similar issues arise in a multitude of regions across Africa. Although the issues also arise 
in other areas of the world, Africa seems to be trapped in the spiral of creation and 
destruction. This constant loop of conflict is what Paul Collier notes as the Conflict Trap.  
  In his study The Bottom Billion, Paul Collier examines the underlying reasons for 
sub-Saharan Africa’s slow growth and the implications that conflict has on these regions. 
The Conflict Trap, as Collier calls it, explains how and why sub-Saharan African countries 
are trapped in conflicts that are hindering their economic development. Even though many 
countries outside sub-Saharan Africa, including the most developed, have experienced 
major conflicts and civil wars, most of them have managed to establish long periods of 
peace that allowed them to create long lasting economic and social development. For 
example, the United States endured a civil war lasting four years. Although this civil 
conflict devastated the economy of the South and heightened tensions between races, the 
North and South were able to reconcile, settle their differences, and work together to 
rebuild industries and institutions.  
In this paper, I refer to Collier's Bottom Billion study as my framework and extend 
the analysis by two decades of data. I will be accounting for data from 1971 to 2016. The 
reason for a start date of 1971 is because it is around this decade that many African 
countries gained independence from European colonies – e.g., the independence of 
Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi from British rule in 1968.2 By 1977, 
54 African countries had seceded from European colonial rulers.3 In addition, more data 
was available in the early 1970’s than in the previous decade. The variables examined in 
                                                
2 Ibid.  
3 “Decolonisation of Africa.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 6 Apr. 2018, 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decolonisation_of_Africa 
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this study include growth of GDP per capita, peace/conflict dummy variable for each year, 
level of secondary education, and foreign direct investment in most sub-Saharan African 
countries. Observing these specific variables, I use regression analysis to determine the 
impact of conflict on the change of per capita GDP growth from 1971 to 2015.  
The results concur with Colliers study for the earlier period. By first running a 
regression with just conflict year, then adding one more variables to each model, I have a 
regression output table with clear and concise results. When a country is experiencing 
conflict, the growth of the GDP per capita declines by 1.704 percentage points. This decline 
in GDP per capita growth is caused by many factors such as destruction of institutions, 
death of civilians, etc. I will outline more of these causes in detail later in this paper.  
In a second model, secondary education enrollment rate is included. This education 
variable is lagged by 5 years to fully include those who attained a secondary education and 
contribute to the GDP. With the inclusion of this variable, the conflict dummy variable 
continues to indicate a drop in GDP per capita growth, this time by 1.150 percentage points. 
However, the secondary education variable itself was found to be insignificant. Model 3 
includes the previous variables while also adding foreign direct investment (FDI) into the 
regression. FDI was significant, indicating a positive growth in GDP per capita with higher 
levels of foreign investment. Overall, the coefficients on education were significant, except 
for secondary education.  
The following section will delve into the historical background of sub-Saharan 
Africa and will discuss why these regions of Africa stand where they are relative to the rest 
of the world. The data section then examines the process of collecting data and discusses 
the importance of each of the observed variables. After discussing the data, this thesis 
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provides a detailed breakdown of the regression analysis, including the regression steps as 
well as the implications of the results.  
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II. Background: A History of Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa was not always in the state we find it in today. Historically, the 
region has been the site of many empires and kingdoms, including the Axum, Wagadu 
(Ghana), Mali, Nok, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu, Benin, and Great Zimbabwe (New World 
Encyclopedia 2015). However, with European interest in Africa increasing dramatically in 
the late 19th century, Africa was divided among the main powers of Europe. In the 1960’s, 
sub-Saharan countries pushed for democracy and independence from the European 
colonies and protectorates as they aimed for equal status and more control over their 
political future, government, and natural resources. Historical legacies play a role in 
subsequent patterns of armed conflict. Most African countries left colonial dominance 
without armed conflict. The countries that had a violent struggle for independence were 
much more prone to conflict as independent states.4 Today, sub-Saharan Africa is the 
poorest region in the world, still suffering from the legacies of colonialism, slavery, native 
corruption, economic polices dictated by international organizations, and inter-ethnic 
conflict.5 Moreover, the region contains many of the least developed countries in the world.  
There are a multitude of factors that can be correlated to sub-Saharan Africa’s 
poverty, from disease to lack of education, etc. Many of these factors stem from a common 
source – conflict. In fact, Africa is the most conflict ridden region of the world and the only 
region in which the number of armed conflicts is on the rise.6 Yet, while no African nation 
                                                
4 “Armed Conflict.” SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015,  
5 “Sub-Saharan Africa.” Sub-Saharan Africa - New World Encyclopedia, New World 
Encyclopedia, 23 Oct. 2015.  
6 “Armed Conflict.” SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015. 
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has joined the ranks of the developed nations, the entire continent is not completely 
impoverished. There is also considerable variation in its wealth in countries such as South 
Africa and Ethiopia.  
 
*Table 1: Per capita GDP for different countries grouped by civil war and non civil war. 
Civil War Sierra 
Leone 
(1991) 
DRC 
(1994) 
Liberia 
(1990) 
Rwanda 
 
(1990) 
Per capita GDP in 
current $U.S. 
156.9951224	 144.5206962	
 
183.2892117	
 
271.0814379	
	
Non-Civil War Kenya  Burkina Faso 
 
Botswana 
 
Cameroon 
 
 Per capita GDP in 
current $U.S. 
337.1221889	
 
193.0702363	
 
2750.950026	
 
951.8882236	
	
 
The figure above illustrates the difference in GDP per capita between two countries, 
accounting for civil war. The civil war countries are listed with the start date of a major 
civil war. Below this, the GDP per capita of the non-civil war countries are listed for that 
same year. Although there are many factors that contribute to the GDP per capita of a 
country, such as population and foreign investment, this table shows that sub-Saharan 
African countries experiencing civil war have significantly lower GDP per capita compared 
to those countries that did not experience civil war.  
The poorest states are those engaged in or just emerging from civil wars, including 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Somalia among others. The 
rise in conflict combined with recent concerns – AIDS pandemic, food and water shortages, 
gender inequality – have caused Africa’s economies to diverge from the growing 
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economies of the majority of the world. The world is developing quickly, but as Collier 
states, “the real challenge of development is that there is a group of countries at the bottom 
that are falling behind, and often falling apart” (Collier 2008). Collier further explains, 
“Africa has experienced a rising trend of conflict because its economies have performed 
so poorly both absolutely and relative to other regions” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). 
Although this means a decreasing standard of living economically, the civil conflicts taking 
place in these sub-Saharan African countries also have a negative effect on the many 
societies. Rather than looking forward to new technological inventions and access to 
enriching resources, these societies are “dominated by individual fear of falling rather than 
hope coming from society-wide progress” (Collier 2008). Now, the question must be 
asked: how quickly are these African countries diverging from the rest of the developed 
world? 
 During the 1970s, the bottom billion diverged in growth from the rest of the 
developing world by 2 percent a year, accelerating to an astonishing 5 percent a year in the 
1990s (Collier 2008). As Collier explains, the three decades from 1960 to 1990 illustrate 
one massive and accelerating divergence among the countries of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Collier 2008). Over the past five and a half decades, which my data largely focuses on, 
the average person in societies of the bottom billion have had incomes dramatically lower 
– around 1/6 – than that of the typical person in a developed country. What is being done 
on a global scale to help these poor countries grow?  
Nowadays, there is a larger focus on poverty reduction than on GDP growth rates. 
There is financial assistance being received from every corner of the globe. Some U.S. 
development assistance programs such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 
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and the Africa Development Foundation (ADF) have shown lasting results in programs 
that stimulate local economies and reduce aid dependency – such as sustainable agriculture, 
youth entrepreneurship, and improved access to power.7 In spite of the positive intentions 
and positive impacts of this foreign assistance, it has resulted in a certain sense of 
dependence among Africans. The aid programs have not necessarily been designed to 
encourage long lasting economic development. If taught proper business skills, the 
recipient African countries could use the aid to purchase goods and services from the same 
countries supplying the aid in the first place.  
Much of this dependence can be attributed to the lack of consistent growth across 
the continent. In order to spur growth and counteract the divergence in income, African 
governments need to create the enabling environment to build prosperity in Africa through 
concrete priorities such as job creation, regional integration, and economic engagement.8 
One sector where Africa is dependent is trade. The current level of trade between African 
states is only 12 percent compared to 60 percent for Europe, 40 percent for North America, 
and 30 percent for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), according to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The CFTA, though, would establish the world’s largest 
single market and effectively boost trade between African states by 50 percent.9 When 
combined with good governance and political stability, intra-Africa trade and deepening 
market integration will significantly increase economic growth, job creation, employment, 
                                                
7 Kwemo, Angelle B. “Making Africa Great Again: Reducing Aid Dependency.” Brookings, 
Brookings, 27 Apr. 2017.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid. 
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poverty reduction, inflow of foreign direct investment, industrial development, and better 
integration of the continent into the global economy.10 
 Another issue slowing growth within the continent of Africa is the growing 
population. Rapid population growth overstrains educational systems and local economies 
and can be a challenge to any government. In the past year the population of the African 
continent grew by 30 million.11 By the year 2050, annual increases will exceed 42 million 
people per year and total population will have doubled to 2.4 billion, according to the UN.12 
Population growth is not necessarily bad, but the government must keep up. The reality is 
that as the size of any populace expands, governments must construct infrastructure apace. 
Failure to do so results in per capita declines in living standards.13 Taking this into account, 
this model observes GDP per capita growth rate as oppose to GDP growth rate since 
population is considered an important variable for gauging economic changes in times of 
civil conflict.  
In this thesis, I examine the two decades following Collier’s work, up to 2015, to 
indicate how far these countries have diverged in growth relative to the previous decades, 
and how civil war is affecting this decline. More specifically, to identify for shifts in GDP 
per capita growth rates across the majority of sub-Saharan African countries, the following 
section focuses on the specific implications that civil war and terrorism have recently and 
historically had on sub-Saharan Africa economies. 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 Bish, Joseph J, and Director of Issue Advocacy at the Population Media Center. “Population 
Growth in Africa: Grasping the Scale of the Challenge.” The Guardian, Guardian News and 
Media, 11 Jan. 2016. 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
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Conflict Traps 
 
All societies used to be poor. With hard work, thrift, and intelligence, a society can 
gradually climb out of poverty, unless it gets trapped (Collier 2008). There are many 
development trap studies in academia. The trap this thesis focuses on is known as the 
conflict trap. Over the last 30 years, worldwide absolute poverty has fallen sharply from 
about 40% to under 20%.14 But in African countries the percentage has barely fallen. 
Today, over 40% of people living in sub-Saharan Africa live in absolute poverty.15 The 
majority of the economies of the sub-Saharan region are dependent on subsistence 
agriculture and the export of natural resources, such as coffee and metal. This reliance on 
the environment combined with the exploitation of resources is clearly something than 
cannot continue forever and is negatively impacting African economies. However, can this 
account for the immense levels of poverty being observed across the continent? To answer 
such a question, it is crucial to further examine what Collier terms as conflict traps.  
Many countries have had civil wars at one time or another – the United States had 
one in the nineteenth century, Russia one early in the twentieth century, and Britain one 
back in the seventeenth – but, as these examples show, wars are not necessarily traps. 
However, given its colonization history, Africa is different. But first, it is imperative to 
indicate what factors are linked to civil war at the fundamental level.  
The first link, as Collier and his colleague Anke Hoeffler suggest, is initial level of 
income. Put simply, low income indeed heightens the risk of civil war (Collier 2008). The 
                                                
14 “Poverty.” Our Africa, www.our-africa.org/poverty. 
15 Ibid. 
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clearest evidence for this arises during colonialism when many countries experienced 
decades of enforced peace; the near-simultaneous decolonization of many countries with 
very different income levels provided a natural experiment for the effect of income on civil 
war (Collier 2008). Second, slow growth/stagnation/decline make a country more prone to 
breaking into civil war. As an approximation, a typical low-income country faces a risk of 
civil war of about 14 percent in any five-year period; each percentage point added to the 
growth rate knocks off a percentage point from this risk.16 Many assumptions can be made 
to explain the phenomenon of low income and slow growth increasing the likelihood of 
civil war.  
One assumption could be a nationwide sense of hopelessness. With such a scarcity 
of jobs, it is difficult for young men with minimal education to earn a living. A more 
extreme case is young men joining rebel groups for a sense of purpose and monetary 
compensation. Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these young men a 
small chance of riches (Collier 2008). On top of this, national low-incomes indicate a weak 
economy and weak state, making rebellion less difficult to achieve. Another factor that 
increases the risk of civil war for a given country is dependence upon primary commodity 
exports such as oil, cocoa, coffee, diamonds, metals, etc. Natural resources often times help 
to finance conflict and sometimes even help to motivate it, ie., conflict diamonds.17  
Although the mentioned factors can give us information on the risk of civil war, 
they do not explain why these countries in sub-Saharan Africa are failing. The answer lies 
in the aftermath of the conflict. Most of the costs of civil war, perhaps as much as half, 
                                                
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid.  
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accrue after the war is over. There is often a deterioration in political rights, schooling, and 
standard of living combined with an increase in disease and illiteracy rates. Generally, once 
a war has begun, the economic damage undoes the growth achieved during peace.18  
A country such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo will need around half a 
century of peace at its rate of growth in 1990 simply to get back to the income level it had 
in 1960 (Collier 2008). With its low income, slow growth, and reliance on primary 
commodities, it is unlikely that the D.R.C or any country with these characteristics will 
have extended periods of peace. Not all countries like this fall into the conflict trap, but 
they are all prone to it (Collier 2008). Although many African governments continue to be 
dysfunctional, some have now substantially liberalized controls and improved service 
provision; however, since these improvements are recent, their effect on growth remains 
largely prospective.19 The problem of civil war and its effects on Africa’s economies is 
serious, but it is fixable.  
There are a multitude of other factors to consider when determining a country’s risk 
of future civil war. Whatever the factors may be, they all influence civil war and present a 
massive burden to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. The risk of conflict differs 
according to economic characteristics, and the economic characteristics are affected by 
conflict.20 In this thesis, I set up a model that predicts how the incidence of civil war, along 
with other factors, affect the GDP per capita growth across the sub-Saharan African region. 
                                                
18 Ibid.  
19 Collier, Paul, and Jan Willem Gunning. Explaining African Economic Performance. University 
of Oxford 1998.  
20 Ibid.  
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III. Data 
 
The analysis for this paper draws from the World Bank Database. By filtering for all 
sub-Saharan African countries and the time frame of 1971 to 2015, I was able to find a 
sufficient amount of data for each of the four variables I consider. This differs from past 
works – specifically Collier’s Bottom Billion study which looks at years 1960 to 1990– in 
that my data extends two and half decades beyond Collier’s sample period. The World 
Bank Dataset is well-suited for this analysis because it is collected annually, making it 
possible to utilize more recent data. Moreover, the World Bank Dataset contains both 
growth rates along with levels of data. Furthermore, the World Bank Database has data 
spanning back many decades, to 1960. This was beneficial to my study since the data I am 
observing begins in the early 1970’s, which many other data sources did not include.  
From the World Bank data, I obtained the necessary values for GDP per capita growth 
rate, secondary education enrollment rate, and FDI. For the peace/conflict variable, I 
created a dummy variable where 0 would equal peace time and 1 would equal a civil 
conflict. This study defines a civil conflict as: (a) military action was involved, (b) the 
national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance (as measured 
by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) on both sides, and d) at least 
1,000 battle deaths resulted”.21 All of these criteria must be met in order for the conflict 
dummy variable to equal 1. The reason for using these criteria is that they allow for more 
comprehensive data and include low-intensity armed conflicts as well as extremely deadly 
                                                
21 Singer J.D. and M. Small (1982), Resort to Arms: International and civil war, 1816 – 1980, 
Beverly Hills, Ca: Sage  
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wars.22 The acts of conflict observed in the study include only terrorism and civil war that 
meet the above four criteria. Figure 1 illustrates the sum of civil conflicts for many sub-
Saharan African countries over five and a half decades. As seen, the majority of countries 
in this region of the world have experienced a rise in civil conflicts over the past five 
decades, and these conflicts are on the rise.  
 
Figure 1 Shows total occurrences of conflict when variable takes a value of 1 
 
 
To gather this data, I searched for websites that had historical timelines, starting in 
the mid 20th century, of all the conflicts for a given country. Although time-consuming, 
this method of gathering data allowed me to narrow down the conflicts by year, and then 
by the number of causalities. This manual method of aggregating data helped ensure that 
the conflicts are legitimate and that they meet the aforementioned criteria.  
                                                
22 Ibid.  
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For the secondary education variable, it did not make sense to include current 
enrollment rate since those currently enrolled in secondary education do not have an impact 
on the GDP of a country. Although the enrollment rate of students in secondary education 
may have an effect on the probability of conflict in a given year, which would impact the 
per capita GDP growth rate, this study assumes that it is typically those who are working 
and out of school that impact the economy. To account for this, I lagged the enrollment of 
secondary education by 5 years; therefore, the data is now accounting for those who ended 
their secondary education 5 years prior to a given year.  
Unlike many studies done on the economic impact of civil wars in Africa (e.g., 
Anyanwu 2002), this study sheds light on the role of education in African economies. 
While many previous studies focus on the incidence of civil war and aim to predict future 
civil conflicts, the study focuses more narrowly on the implications of these conflicts on 
the countries’ per capita GDP growth. The variable added to explain the relationship 
between the education of each country’s peoples and conflict is secondary education. This 
correlation between education and GDP per capita deserves more attention in this literature, 
as education has been largely undermined in poorer regions of the world. Many previous 
studies on this topic have emphasized foreign investment and other economic factors, 
whereas education provides a huge opportunity for growth and development in these 
impoverished regions.  
There are, however, some limitations to the use of World Bank data. The main 
drawback is one that occurs across all databases, which is the lack of data on the African 
continent. Many sub-Saharan African countries gained independence as European colonies 
in the 1960’s. With the task of having to implement new governments and restructure their 
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countries’ institutions, it is no surprise that much data does not appear until the early 
1970’s. In addition, by observing the difference between Table 4 and Table 3 in the results 
section, it is clear that 21 countries are missing observations for secondary education; 
certain countries also have incoherent data for this education enrollment variable. One 
plausible reason for these gaps in data is that very few students continue on to secondary 
school. If they do enroll in secondary school, many students drop out for different reasons. 
Job prospects for most people in the developing world are poor, and staying in school past 
grade 5, or even through grade 10, does not improve them significantly.23 In impoverished 
regions, the vast majority will not secure formal employment and will be supported 
primarily through subsistence level agriculture and trading.24 Due to missing data, I am 
only able to include 27 countries in my study when including the secondary education 
variable.  
Another limitation with the World Bank data is the lack of a conflict variable. In 
order to account for a civil conflict, I manually researched historical timelines of all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Taking Collier’s definition of a civil conflict into account 
(defined above) I created an excel spreadsheet with every country containing years 1971 
to 2015, and labeled a peace year as 0 and a conflict year as 1. Rather than observing overall 
peace and conflict duration, I independently looked at each year to determine peace or 
conflict since the model is accounting for year-to-year GDP per capita growth rate. 
Although the World Bank did not include this data, I was able to form a comprehensive 
                                                
23 Epstein, Mark J, and Kristi Yuthas. “Redefining Education in the Developing World 
(SSIR).”Stanford Social Innovation Review: Informing and Inspiring Leaders of Social Change, 
Stanford University , Dec. 2012, 
24 Ibid.  
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spreadsheet accounting for the years of peace and conflict for sub-Saharan African 
countries.  
With the panel data obtained for all three independent variables, along with the GDP 
per capita growth rates as the dependent variable, I ran regressions to test the impact of 
civil conflict, FDI, and secondary education enrollment rates to determine their effects on 
the year-by-year change in GDP per capita growth rates.  
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IV. Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
 
Table 1 shows the regression analysis results. The coefficients illustrate the affect of the 
given variables on GDP per capita growth. All of the variables are significant, except for 
secondary education.  
 
Table 1  Impact on GDP per capita growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Conflictyear -1.704*** -1.150** -1.468** 
 (0.391) (0.546) (0.582) 
LagSecondaryedu  0.0119 -0.0241 
  (0.0136) (0.0153) 
logFDI   0.00606*** 
   (0.00117) 
Constant 1.575*** 1.063* -8.221*** 
 (0.310) (0.549) (1.951) 
    
Observations 1,874 791 696 
Number of CountryNum 47 27 27 
 
 
In order to determine whether civil conflict plays a role in explaining GDP per 
capita growth rate, I estimate a linear probability regression model using cross sectional 
panel data as follows:  
 
Models  
 
(1) Basic Model:     𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
(2) Regression Model:  
 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐(𝑡) = 	𝛼 + 	𝐵1 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑡 + 𝐵2 𝑙5. 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑢 𝑡	 + 	𝐵3(𝐹𝐷𝐼)𝑡 
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This study utilizes panel data by combining cross-sectional and time series data. The 
number of sub-Saharan African countries is the cross-sectional data, and is being examined 
alongside 44 years – 1971 to 2015. Panel data is advantageous since it provides multiple 
observations on each individual in the sample, allowing for the model to capture a larger 
number of observations. Moreover, panel data increases the degrees of freedom and 
reduces the collinearity among explanatory variables, hence improving the efficiency of 
econometric estimates.25 The oft-touted power of panel data also derives from its 
theoretical ability to identify the effects of specific actions, treatments, or more general 
policies.26 In this study, the model is able to determine the individual effect of three 
variables on GDP per capita growth rate.  
The dependent variable used in this study is the relative year-by-year growth of GDP 
per capita (in percent). It is important to recognize GDP per capita as the growth rate as 
oppose to simply the level of GDP. The reason being that countries have different 
populations, resources, and other factors that individually affect the GDP.  
 
Table 2   Summary Statistics of GDP per capita growth 
 
                                                
25 Hsiao (2003), Analysis of Panel Data, Cambridge University Press 
26 Hurlin , Christophe. “Advanced Econometrics II.” School of Economics and Management - 
University of Geneva. University of Orlèans.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
growthGDPpc 1,913 1.265027 7.678233 -50.23014 140.5011 
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As seen above, the average growth rate of GDP per capita across all the sub-Saharan 
African countries observed is positive 1.26 percentage points. Percentage points represent 
the arithmetic difference of two percentages. Looking at percentage growth rates are 
relevant when we are thinking of “exits” from poverty, since small absolute changes may 
be enough to get people from below the magical $1.25 line to just above it; however, they 
are still poor by global standards.27 Moreover, as depicted in the Table 2, some countries 
experience as much as a 50% fall in per capita GDP growth rate. This number is large, but 
plausible, since civil conflict will further magnify the issues (AIDS, infant mortality, 
illiteracy) that are already hindering social and economic development in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Many developed countries do not have these pressing issues, so conflict has less of 
an impact on those economies than sub-Saharan African economies.  
The right hand side of the regression model equation contains three independent 
variables measured over the years 1971 to 2015. The first coefficient is conflict year, which 
is observed as a dummy variable, 1 for conflict and 0 for peace. β2 is multiplied by 
secondary education. This specific variable is lagged by 5 years in order to account for a 
more realistic impact of the population on GDP. Those in secondary education do not have 
a direct impact on the economy. However, 5 years after graduation is a sensible timeframe 
for those who completed secondary education to implement their skills in the workforce. 
The third independent variable included in the regression analysis is foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which quantifies investments made by a company or individual in a 
country abroad.  
                                                
27 McKenzie, David. “Let's Not Overstate the Achievements of China and India – Here Are the 
Real Growth Stars.” Impact Evaluations, 11 June 2012. 
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When running the regressions, the first step taken was to merge the different datasets 
for each variable in order to properly run regressions with the program used. The second 
step was to account for fixed effects. Accounting for fixed effects allows the group means 
to be fixed (non-random).28 After having merged the datasets, it was important to decide 
how to present the regression results. As seen in Table 1 above, three models are presented, 
where each subsequent model includes an additional variable.  
Model 1 regresses the conflict year dummy variable against the growth GDP per capita. 
Analyzing the results, one notices the statistical significance of Conflictyear at the one 
percent level. A conflict in a given year is shown to decrease the per capita GDP growth 
rate by 1.704 percentage points, indicating the negative impact that civil conflicts have on 
these economies and societies.  
Model 2 finds similar results regarding conflict, depicting a drop of 1.150 percentage 
points in GDP per capita growth when conflict occurs; this model also includes secondary 
education enrollment rate, lagged for 5 years. By including secondary education, this study 
attempts to find a relationship between enrollment rate of secondary education students 
and the growth of GDP per capita. Referring to Table 1 above, secondaryEdu, is 
insignificant, even though it shows a positive impact on GDP per capita growth. The reason 
for including education in this model is that the kind of people most likely to engage in 
political violence are the young, the uneducated, and those without dependents (Collier 
2008). Studies demonstrate that education can lift a country out of poverty and that 
education can contribute to a to a stronger middle class, civil society and rule of law; hence, 
                                                
28 Ramsey, F., Schafer, D., 2002. The Statistical Sleuth: A Course in Methods of Data Analysis, 
2nd ed. Duxbury Press 
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one would assume, a more peaceful society (McMahon 2003). In Table 1, adding 
LagSecondaryedu affects the response variable by lowering the impact of conflict on GDP 
per capita growth rate from 1.704 to 1.150 percentage points.  
An explanation is that there are many other factors aside from secondary level of 
education that impact sub-Saharan African economies, such as agriculture, natural 
resources, and technology. These same factors also impact the enrollment rate of secondary 
education. For example, an increase in technology can provide schools with better 
recourses and younger generations with new potential skillsets to learn. By providing 
students with more opportunities through secondary education, more young men will look 
to attain these useful skills and will be less likely to join rebel groups. 
Model 3 includes FDI to gauge the effect of foreign direct investment on GDP per 
capita growth. Foreign direct investment net inflows indicate a positive impact on the 
economies of sub-Saharan African countries. The numbers in the FDI dataset are recorded 
in terms of actual level in current U.S. dollars for a given year. Taking the log of FDI and 
multiplying this by 100, the variable logFDI makes Table 1 simpler to interpret. A 1% 
change in FDI is represented by a 1 unit change in log of FDI. Therefore, a positive .006 
logFDI indicates a .006 percent increase in GDP per capita growth rate for each 1% change 
in FDI. By looking at the coefficient in this way, recognizing the dependent variable as 
growth rate and FDI in log form, the positive impact of FDI on the dependent variable 
becomes clear.  
The reason for including FDI is to check whether investments made to a sub-Saharan 
African country positively impact the economy. Having more investments and abundant 
resources may sound like a benefit rather than a disadvantage. However, as Collier explains 
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in The Bottom Billion, with countries like Sudan and Somalia, even though natural 
resources are abundant and foreign aid is present, corrupt politicians and other leading 
authorities within the country are able to seize power and divide the spoils, making their 
economies more vulnerable.29 However, what is found in this study is that FDI does in fact 
have a positive impact on growth of GDP per capita. When it comes to war-torn countries 
such as Rwanda, Congo, Somalia and Sudan, the conflict leads to a destroyed economy, 
damaged lives of innocent civilians, and political unrest. In countries with similar 
dilemmas, foreign direct investment provides capital to help spur infrastructure and 
industry growth.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Awanyo, Vanessa. “The Bottom Billion: Causes and Solutions.” The Borgen Project, 4 Dec. 
2017. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
 
In this study, I have applied an econometric model of civil conflict to analyze the 
incidence of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa – the only region which conflict has been on a 
rising trend.30 Previous literature by Paul Collier focused on this complex relationship for 
the years 1960 to 1990. This study follows the methods adopted by Collier, but extends the 
dataset by examining years 1971 to 2015 to examine more recent trends in civil conflict 
and the effects this conflict has on sub-Saharan African economies.  
The results of this study offers insight on both the impact of conflict and the 
influence of education and foreign direct investment on GDP per capita growth rate. The 
findings depict a strong relationship between conflict and FDI on GDP per capita growth, 
yet do not find a significant relationship between secondary education and GDP per capita 
growth. The discussion following the data section explains the reasons for using these 
specific variables and the impact they have on the GDP per capita growth of sub-Saharan 
African countries. With conflict and political turmoil constantly present in the majority of 
these sub-Saharan African countries, it is difficult to point to one factor that is causing this 
instability. Civil conflict, as shown in this study, is truly detrimental to the growth of a 
country’s economy. Yet, how do these countries aim to maintain peace?  
Government corruption is something that must be monitored and addressed. Even 
with increased foreign direct investment, much of this money is not properly allocated and 
often makes it way to rebel groups and the pockets of politicians. Also, there must be 
                                                
30 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. On the Incedence of Civil War in Africa. Sage Publications, 
2002. 
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increased unity among the continent. The majority of these countries were once colonized 
by Europe, causing fractionalization and differences within and between countries. Today, 
by focusing on establishing similar institutions and organizations, many neighboring 
countries have the ability to establish rapport among their governments, minimizing the 
possibility of intrastate and interstate conflict. Moreover, by policing the allocation of 
foreign investments, this money can be used to restructure the education systems in those 
countries with low literacy rate and minimal specialized skills. Africa is growing; its people 
are smart, bright, and becoming more aware of the technological growth happening within 
and outside the continent. With the proper policing of money (foreign investment and 
government capital), and further efforts towards inter-continent camaraderie, Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s true potential can be untapped.  
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VI. Appendix Tables and Figures  
 
Table 1  
 
*GDP per Capita in USD for all sub-Saharan African countries, years 1971 to 2015 
*Current $US  
*Attained from World Bank Database  
 
 
Country Name 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Burundi 72.12955294	
 
69.63919255 85.04700015 95.41395105 
Benin 112.5700891	
 
134.8194079 161.9873737 174.0141491 
Burkina Faso 84.28781501	
 
99.32676402 113.7805843 124.3590305 
Botswana 176.663797	
 
222.46945 317.6646403 384.4187546 
Central African 
Republic 
108.0397857	
 
121.1997304 140.0130735 142.4427623 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Conflict dummy variable for all sub-Saharan African countries, years 1971 to 
2015 
 
Country Name 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Angola  1	 1 1 1 
Burundi 0 1 0 0 
Benin 0 0 0 0 
Burkina Faso 0	 0 0 0 
Botswana 0 0 0 0 
Central African 
Republic 
0 0 0 0 
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Table 3 Secondary education for many sub-Saharan African countries, years 1971 to 
2015.  
*Enrollment Rate (% gross) 
 
Country Name 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Burundi 1.812440038 1.881800056 1.415230036 1.755959988 
Burkina Faso 1.283669949	 1.31716001 1.401350021 1.628149986 
Central African 
Republic 
4.412930012 5.387899876 6.084849834 6.62594986 
Cote d’Ivoire 10.35836983 11.29491043 12.18095016 11.80152035 
Cameroon 7.982419968 8.898830414 9.923540115 10.69795063 
 
 
 
Table 4 Foreign Direct Investment for many sub-Saharan African countries, years 1971 
to 2015. 
 
Country Name 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Burundi 450000 150000 270000 X	
Benin 1860000	 2160000 7540000 6690000 
Central African 
Republic 
- 48157265.38 108207643.8 -553260283.6 6690000 
Cote d’Ivoire 6940000 10510000 3410000 1630000 
Cameroon 125670000 71720000 100250000 17920000 
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